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Abstract 22 
Can hazard perception testing be useful for the emergency services? Previous research has 23 
found emergency response drivers’ (ERDs) to perform better than controls, however these 24 
studies used clips of normal driving. In contrast, the current study filmed footage from a fire-25 
appliance on blue-light training runs through Nottinghamshire, and endeavoured to 26 
discriminate between different groups of EDRs based on experience and collision risk. Thirty 27 
clips were selected to create two variants of the hazard perception test: a traditional push-28 
button test requiring speeded-responses to hazards, and a prediction test that occludes at 29 
hazard onset and provides four possible outcomes for participants to choose between. Three 30 
groups of fire-appliance drivers (novices, low-risk experienced and high-risk experienced), 31 
and age-matched controls undertook both tests. The hazard perception test only discriminated 32 
between controls and all FA drivers, whereas the hazard prediction test was more sensitive, 33 
discriminating between high and low-risk experienced fire appliance drivers. Eye movement 34 
analyses suggest that the low-risk drivers were better at prioritising the hazardous precursors, 35 
leading to better predictive accuracy. These results pave the way for future assessment and 36 
training tools to supplement emergency response driver training, while supporting the 37 
growing literature that identifies hazard prediction as a more robust measure of driver safety 38 
than traditional hazard perception tests. 39 
 40 
Keywords: hazard perception; hazard prediction; professional drivers; fire service; fire 41 
appliance drivers; emergency response driving. 42 
 43 
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Introduction 46 
A Brief Overview of Hazard Perception 47 
Hazard perception (HP) skill is the ability of a driver to detect on-road hazards that 48 
could cause a potential collision, and it is claimed to be the only higher-order cognitive skill 49 
that reliably relates to crash risk in drivers (Horswill and McKenna, 2004). This skill is 50 
typically measured using video clips of real driving filmed from the driver’s perspective, 51 
from a windscreen or roof-mounted video camera. The driver watches the video clips on a 52 
computer and must make a response (usually a simple button press) to any perceived hazard. 53 
The speed of the button press is the typical primary measure of judging driver safety, based 54 
on the simple premise that if drivers can spot on-road hazards quickly, they are more likely to 55 
avoid them. There have been a number of studies that have found hazard perception tests to 56 
discriminate between experienced, safer drivers and novice, or less-safe, drivers (e.g. Pelz & 57 
Krupat, 1974; Watts & Quimby, 1979; McKenna and Crick, 1991; Deery, 1999; Wallis & 58 
Horswill, 2007; Horswill et al., 2008; Pradhan et al., 2009; Horswill, Taylor, Newnam, 59 
Wetton, & Hill, 2013; Scialfa et al., 2011). Performance on a hazard perception test has even 60 
been found to predict the likelihood of being involved in a future traffic collision 61 
(Drummond, 2000; Boufous et al., 2011), which supports suggestions that under-developed 62 
hazard perception skill contributes to the over-representation of novice drivers in the collision 63 
statistics (Horswill and McKenna, 2004; Maycock et al., 1991; Underwood, 2007). 64 
While certain aspects of hazard perception testing have been questioned in the 65 
academic literature (e.g. Crundall et al., 2012), the UK Government found the evidence 66 
sufficiently compelling to bring in such a test as part of the driver licensing procedure in 67 
2002. Six years later a Government-sponsored research team reported that the introduction of 68 
the hazard perception test had resulted in a significant decrease in the number of certain types 69 
of collision on UK roads (Wells et al., 2008). This was considered to be due to keeping 70 
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exceptionally poor drivers off the roads, while encouraging the average learner driver to 71 
practice the higher-order cognitive tasks involved in predicting and responding to on-road 72 
hazards. 73 
 74 
Hazard perception in the emergency services 75 
If experience and training lead to improved hazard perception performance, one might 76 
imagine that those professional drivers, who are trained to drive under extreme conditions, 77 
such as emergency response drivers, should display the greatest levels of hazard perception 78 
ability. Indeed, several studies have compared ambulance drivers and police drivers to control 79 
groups, and found that these professional drivers exhibit superior response times to hazards in 80 
video clips of everyday driving (Johnston & Scialfa, 2016; McKenna & Crick, 1991; 81 
Horswill et al., 2013). This superiority may reflect the fact that they are exposed to, and 82 
trained under, extreme conditions. Thus, when presented with a hazard perception test of 83 
normal driving clips, they find it relatively easy to identify the hazards, as the filmed driving 84 
occurs at a slower speed and involves more predictable manoeuvres than the emergency 85 
response scenarios they are regularly exposed to (see ‘above real time training’ for an 86 
approach that seeks to exploit this effect, Lorains, Ball, & MacMahon, 2013). 87 
While these studies support the hypothesis that increased training and exposure can 88 
positively develop HP skill in normal driving conditions (though we acknowledge that self-89 
selection may still play a part), they tell us nothing about how emergency service drivers cope 90 
with hazards in the line of duty. Travelling at speed relative to other traffic, contravening 91 
road rules, and influencing the actions of other road users via sirens and lights, are all likely 92 
to create hazards that the average driver will never need to worry about. A hazard perception 93 
test cannot assess emergency drivers’ abilities in detecting these hazards without using 94 
footage captured from realistic blue-light scenarios (i.e. filmed from a vehicle travelling 95 
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under blue-lights and sirens). To the authors’ knowledge, only one previous study has been 96 
published that used blue-light video footage, filmed from police cars involved in pursuit and 97 
emergency response situations (Crundall et al., 2003, 2005), which demonstrated that police 98 
drivers’ eye movements and electrodermal responses differed to those of control drivers.  99 
What all the above studies lack, however, is the opportunity to discriminate between 100 
safe and less-safe drivers within the emergency services. If HP skill is a cause of novice 101 
driver collisions, as put forward in the literature, then does this transfer to other end of the 102 
spectrum of experience (i.e. can HP skill still explain why some highly experienced drivers 103 
have collisions and others do not)? The findings of Horswill et al., (2013) certainly suggest 104 
that this could be the case. They demonstrated that even highly experienced drivers could 105 
benefit from hazard perception training, suggesting that HP skill might be a valuable 106 
diagnostic and training tool even within a group of professional emergency service drivers.  107 
While the diagnostic efficacy of hazard perception tests at the upper end of the 108 
experience spectrum is an important theoretical question, it is also essential for the practical 109 
application of an HP test for the emergency services. The emergency services are not 110 
interested in demonstrating that their drivers are better than non-emergency service drivers at 111 
spotting hazards. They are, however, interested in identifying those emergency response 112 
drivers who are at risk, and could therefore benefit from additional training. Thus, a truly 113 
effective HP test should differentiate between emergency response drivers at different levels 114 
of risk, as well as experience, specific to their particular role. This is the aim of the current 115 
study: we want to assess whether HP skill can differentiate between professional driver 116 
groups, and design a test to capture this information for a specific sector of the emergency 117 
services: fire-appliance1 drivers. This will expand our understanding of hazard perception as 118 
a skill that may or may not reach a plateau (Horswill et al., 2013), while simultaneously 119 
developing an HP test that can be used as a cost-effective supplement to on-road training and 120 
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assessment in a service that faces high levels of risk on the roads (e.g. Becker et al., 2003; 121 
Crundall et al., 2003; Maguire et al., 2002) and stringent budget cuts in the UK (Chief Fire 122 
Officers Association, 2015). 123 
 124 
Hazard perception or hazard prediction? 125 
Pradhan and Crundall (2017) selected the term ‘hazard avoidance’ to describe the whole 126 
process of safely navigating a hazard. This includes a variety of sub-processes from searching 127 
for hazardous precursors and prioritising them for subsequent monitoring, through to 128 
processing, appraising, mitigating and responding to hazards when they occur. Hazard 129 
perception reflects a selection of these sub-processes, from visual search through to deciding 130 
whether the hazard really poses a threat. Unfortunately, this means that simple response times 131 
to an HP test confound several sub-processes. For instance, a hazard response does not just 132 
reflect how quickly one spots the hazard, but also how quickly one processed it, and, 133 
crucially, whether the hazardousness of the event reached an individual’s threshold for 134 
reporting. The problem of criterion bias is especially concerning, as the most experienced 135 
drivers are likely to have a higher threshold for what constitutes a hazard. Thus while they 136 
may spot the hazard sooner than less-experienced drivers, they may wait to respond until the 137 
level of hazardousness has reached a relatively high threshold (Crundall, 2016). While we 138 
have briefly reviewed much research that has demonstrated the diagnostic abilities of hazard 139 
perception tests, there are also many studies that have failed to discriminate between driver 140 
groups with a simple push button response (e.g. Chapman and Underwood, 1998; Sagberg 141 
and Bjørnskau, 2006; Borowsky et al., 2010; Underwood et al., 2013). It is possible that 142 
criterion bias in experienced drivers may have caused these mixed findings. 143 
 As an alternative to a push-button response, we can directly measure when drivers 144 
spot hazards using eye tracking technology (and we have done so in the current study), but 145 
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eye tracking is unsuitable for an assessment method intended for wide use. Instead, we may 146 
consider changing the nature of the test to isolate the key component of hazard perception 147 
skill. This has been the aim of a collection of studies that have developed an HP-variant 148 
called the ‘hazard prediction’ test. Based on the Situation Awareness Global Assessment 149 
Technique (SAGAT), the hazard prediction test presents drivers with a series of hazard clips 150 
that are suddenly occluded, just as the hazard begins to develop (Jackson et al., 2009; Castro 151 
et al., 2014; Crundall, 2016; Ventsislavova et al., 2016). Following occlusion, drivers are 152 
simply asked ‘what happens next?’. This test targets the driver’s ability to identify potential 153 
hazard precursors, and extrapolate the likelihood of them leading to a hazard (e.g. a high-154 
sided lorry might hide a small child; a pedestrian walking along the sidewalk and glancing 155 
into the roadway, might step into the road, etc.). These precursors must be hierarchically 156 
prioritised and monitored accordingly, which will give the driver the best opportunity for 157 
identifying which one will actually develop into a hazard. Jackson et al., (2009) argued that 158 
the act of prediction is perhaps the most crucial aspect of hazard perception, as it primes both 159 
the location of future hazards and the ability to process them (though we acknowledge that 160 
the post-prediction processes also have a role to play).  161 
One advantage of this approach is that it removes the need for drivers to compare an 162 
unfolding hazard to an internal criterion, which may then mask their ability to detect hazards 163 
compared to less-safe drivers. Instead of a confounded response time, we record the 164 
percentage accuracy of hazards successfully predicted. While the number of studies 165 
employing this HP-variant are still limited, the evidence suggests that this test is a robust 166 
discriminator of safe and less-safe drivers (Jackson et al., 2009; Castro et al., 2014; Crundall, 167 
2016; Ventsislavova et al., 2016). 168 
The first direct comparison of a hazard perception test with a hazard prediction test 169 
was recently undertaken across three countries: China, Spain and the UK (Ventsislavova et 170 
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al., submitted)2. Novice and experienced drivers did not differ on the hazard perception test, 171 
but the test was found to be sensitive to the nationality of the participants, with Chinese 172 
drivers responding to fewer hazards than UK drivers. We suggested that this might reflect the 173 
higher hazard threshold of Chinese drivers who are typically exposed to a more hazardous 174 
driving environment. The hazard prediction test, however, provided the opposite results. 175 
Cultural differences between participants were reduced, while experienced drivers were 176 
found to out-perform novice drivers regardless of nationality. The results demonstrated that 177 
the hazard prediction test, when unconfounded by criterion level, appears to be a more robust 178 
and culturally-agnostic measure of driver safety. 179 
Based on these data, one might be tempted to argue that the emergency services 180 
would be better served by a hazard prediction test rather than a hazard perception test. 181 
However, given the relative novelty of the hazard prediction test compared to the accepted 182 
success of the hazard perception test, we opted to create both a hazard perception test 183 
(experiment 1) and a hazard prediction test (experiment 2), in order to identify which is most 184 
suitable for discriminating between fire-appliance driver groups. 185 
 186 
The current study 187 
Multiple cameras were placed on a fire appliance (FA) to record footage of blue-light 188 
training runs through the city of Nottingham and the surrounding areas. From over 12 hours 189 
of footage, 30 clips were selected to create a hazard perception test and a hazard prediction 190 
test. The former required speeded responses to hazards (selected a priori from the footage), 191 
while the latter test required participants to identify ‘what happens next?’ by selecting one of 192 
four options following occlusion. Four groups of drivers were recruited to undertake both 193 
tests: A control group of non-emergency service drivers was used as a baseline, while three 194 
groups of FA drivers were defined as novices, high-risk experienced drivers and low-risk 195 
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experienced drivers (based on the number, severity and blameworthiness of self-reported 196 
incidents). Comparisons of these different groups reflect different hypotheses. First, a 197 
comparison of control drivers to all FA drivers reflects the hypothesis that the advanced 198 
training and experience of all FA drivers should result in overall superior performance 199 
compared to average drivers, as noted in the literature (Johnston & Scialfa, 2016; McKenna 200 
& Crick, 1991; Horswill et al., 2013). Secondly, a comparison of novice FA drivers to the 201 
two groups of experienced FA drivers should reveal whether a basic experiential effect could 202 
be found. Given that even the ‘novice’ group would be still be considered as highly-203 
experienced drivers under everyday conditions, this assesses whether experiential differences 204 
in HP tests are task (and therefore hazard) specific. Finally, the high and low-risk groups of 205 
experienced FA drivers were directly compared to assess whether their level of collision-206 
involvement could be differentiated by the tests. 207 
 208 
Experiment 1 209 
The first experiment reports data from a traditional hazard-perception methodology. Four 210 
groups of participants (controls, novice FA drivers, experienced, high-risk FA drivers, and 211 
experienced, low-risk FA drivers) viewed a series of clips recorded from a fire appliance on a 212 
blue-light run, each containing one a priori hazard with a defined temporal scoring window. 213 
Participants had to press a button as soon as they saw a hazard. We predicted that control 214 
drivers would be slower than all FA drivers, that novice FA drivers would be slower than all 215 
experienced FA drivers, and that high-risk, experienced FA drivers would be slower than 216 
low-risk, experienced FA drivers. We also measured participants’ eye movements with the 217 
hypothesis that these data would help explain any behavioural differences between the 218 
groups.  219 
  220 
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Method 221 
Participants 222 
Eighty-four drivers were assigned across four groups. The first group consisted of 21 novice 223 
fire-appliance drivers (18 male, 3 female) with a mean age of 35.4 years, 9571 personal miles 224 
per annum, and a mean personal driving experience of 16.5 years since passing their driving 225 
test. Owing to this being a challenging sample of participants to obtain, novice drivers were 226 
defined as fire fighters who were either currently completing the Emergency Fire-Appliance 227 
Driver (EFAD) course, or who were awaiting their EFAD course.  228 
Forty-three participants were classed as experienced fire-appliance drivers (41 male, 2 229 
female), with a mean age of 42.4 years of ages, a mean of 10.4 years’ experience of fire 230 
appliance driving, a mean of 11069 personal miles per annum, and a mean driving experience 231 
of 23.4 years since passing the driving test. This sample was divided into high and low-risk 232 
groups on the basis of self-reported frequency, severity and blameworthiness of all recalled 233 
collisions across their driving history (including personal and at-work collisions). Severity 234 
ratings for each collision varied between 1 and 3 points, with 1 point reflecting a collision 235 
producing damage of less than £200 value, 2 points reflecting a collision producing damage 236 
of greater than £200 value, and 3 points for a collision resulting in an injury. Blame ratings 237 
also varied between 1 and 3 points, with 1 point reflecting the attribution ‘not my fault’, 2 238 
points for ‘partly my fault’, and 3 points for ‘completely my fault’. These two ratings for each 239 
reported collision were summed producing a risk index for each experienced fire fighter that 240 
combined frequency of collision, severity and blame. The mean number of reported collisions 241 
were 0.56 and 2.85 for low and high-risk groups, with mean summed severity/blame scores 242 
of 1.7 and 10.7, respectively. A split of participants based on their risk indices resulted in 23 243 
participants classified as low-risk (on or below the median) and 20 participants considered 244 
high-risk (all above the median).  245 
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The final group was made up of 20 control drivers (19 male, 1 female). Their mean 246 
age was 43.9 years, with 9252 personal miles per annum, and they had a mean personal 247 
driving experience of 22 years since passing their driving test. A comparison of age and 248 
personal driving experience between the control group and the fire fighter cohort as a whole 249 
did not reveal any significant differences (p > 0.1). 250 
 251 
Materials and apparatus 252 
Filming 253 
The fire-appliance hazard perception test was developed from footage that was captured from 254 
multiple fire appliances on blue-light training runs. All clips were filmed around 255 
Nottinghamshire over a four-week period in April – May 2015. The filming took place during 256 
a number of Emergency Fire-Appliance Driver (EFAD) courses to avoid the necessity of 257 
undertaking additional non-emergency blue-light runs beyond those required for training 258 
purposes. In total approximately 12 hours of footage was obtained from the fire appliances. 259 
Filming from the fire appliances required a 7 camera system in order to capture the 260 
forward view from the cabin and the 6 views that are available to the driver through the 261 
mirrors (See Figure 1a to see a schematic representation of the separate video feeds). The 262 
mirror information was subsequently combined with the forward view, and with a graphic 263 
overlay of the cabin interior to create an immersive experience (see Figure 1b for a screen 264 
shot from a finished clip).  265 
 266 
 267 
 268 
 269 
(A) 
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 270 
 271 
Figure 1. Panel A: A schematic depiction of the envisioned view of the final edited clips, 272 
with numbers relating to the different video feeds; Panel B: a screen shot from one of the 273 
final fire appliance clips that combines all seven video feeds with the graphic overlay of the 274 
cabin interior. 275 
 276 
A GoPro HERO4 Silver Edition camcorder recording in Full High Definition format 277 
(1080p, 16:9 ratio, wide-angle setting) was positioned on the dashboard of the fire appliance 278 
(B) 
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to capture the forward view. For mirror views, six JVC Action Cameras (Model Number: 279 
GC-XA1BU; 1080p, 16:9 ratio) were mounted externally using suction mounts aligned with 280 
the mirrors, but positioned to avoid obstruction for the driver. Four of these cameras were 281 
mounted on the doors to capture wing mirror and blind spot mirror views (feeds 2, 3, 4, & 5 282 
in Figure 1a). One further camera was positioned on the left of the vehicle pointing 283 
downwards to provide kerb distance information (feed 6), with a final camera placed on the 284 
external windscreen pointing downwards to capture the blind spot in front of the cab (feed 7). 285 
All external cameras were tethered to the vehicle for safety. 286 
 287 
Creating the tests 288 
Prior to video editing, a graphic overlay was designed to represent the interior of a fire 289 
appliance (see Figures 1b). A-pillars and the internal roof of the fire-appliance cabin was 290 
designed to be partially transparent to prevent these parts of the graphic overlay from 291 
obscuring aspects of the forward view. This was done to mimic the effects of stereopsis and 292 
head movements, which naturally minimise A-pillar obscuration in real driving.  293 
Footage from the multiple cameras was synchronised in Adobe Premiere CC, and 294 
then reviewed by a team of transport psychologists and fire service personnel in order to 295 
select the most promising stimuli. A total of 30 clips were chosen on the basis that they 296 
provided at least one hazard of sufficient concern to warrant a response. These hazards also 297 
had to have precursors (i.e. a non-hazardous element of the scene that foreshadows a potential 298 
hazard. Such precursors are essential for a hazard perception test as they provide subtle cues 299 
that prime the impending hazard, which safer drivers are more likely to spot and comprehend 300 
than less-safe drivers. Hazard onset times (i.e. the earliest point at which participants could 301 
make a correct response to the hazard) were based on the point at which an obstacle begins to 302 
move into the path of the approaching fire appliance. Hazard offsets (i.e. the latest point at 303 
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which a participant could make a correct response to the hazard) reflected the point at which 304 
a response would no longer beneficial to helping avoid the hazard. A description of the 305 
selected hazards is given in Table 1. The clips did not contain an audio track. 306 
The thirty clips were divided into two tests each containing 15 clips. Half of the 307 
drivers saw clips 1-15 as a hazard perception test (while clips 16-30 were presented as a 308 
hazard prediction test: see experiment 2), and the other half of the participants viewed clips 309 
16-30 as a hazard perception test (and clips 1-15 as a hazard prediction test). 310 
 311 
Data collection apparatus 312 
The hazard perception test presented on a computer monitor, measuring 48.3 cm x 30.5 cm. 313 
The monitor was connected to a SensoMotoric Instruments’ Remote Eye-tracking Device, 314 
sampling at 500Hz (SMI RED 500) with a 50 ms threshold for fixations. Participants were 315 
provided with a keyboard to make speeded hazard responses. 316 
 317 
Design 318 
A 1x4 between-groups design was employed, with four driver groups: control drivers, novice 319 
fire appliance drivers, high-risk, experienced fire-appliance drivers, and low-risk, 320 
experienced fire-appliance drivers. All participants watched 15 hazard perception clips, 321 
presented in a random order, and were required to press a button on a keyboard to indicate 322 
that they had detected a hazard. Each hazard contained one a priori hazard that was chosen in 323 
consultation with Fire Service Driving Instructors. Response times to these hazards were the 324 
primary dependent variable. 325 
Responses were considered valid if they fell within a specific temporal hazard 326 
window, defined by the hazard onset and offset points for each clip. Hazard response times 327 
were calculated from the hazard onset.  328 
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Table 1. 329 
A description of the hazards in the final 30 clips selected for the Fire Appliance Hazard 330 
Perception test (onsets and offsets refer to the HPT). 331 
Clip 
no. Hazard  Description 
Hazard 
onset 
(ms) 
Hazard 
offset 
(ms) 
1 Car remains 
stationary in 
the road 
ahead. 
The fire appliance is travelling on a 30mph urban road. 
Ahead, a lollipop lady is in the road allowing children 
and pedestrians to cross. A car is waiting at the lady 
preventing the appliance from making progress.   
23134 30634 
2 Pedestrian in 
the road. 
The fire appliance is travelling on the tram tracks. A 
pedestrian, hidden from view by other pedestrians on 
the pavement, enters the road in front of the appliance.    
39967 42900 
3 Workman in 
the road. 
The fire appliance is travelling on 30mph suburban 
road. A workman, partially obscured by a work lorry, 
is working in the road and does not notice the 
appliance.  
25067 27034 
 
4 Large lorry 
ahead. 
The appliance is travelling on a 30mph inner city road. 
The appliance approaches a set of traffic lights of 
which the left-side turn and view is blocked by a large 
building. As the appliance approaches, a large lorry 
from the left pulls out in front of the appliance.  
21000 26534 
5 Van with 
trailer pulls 
out.  
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. A van 
towing a trailer does not notice the appliance and pulls 
out in front of it to overtake a car that has pulled over 
on the left. 
25200 29900 
6 Pedestrians 
walk in the 
road. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. A 
mother with children turns on the right-hand pavement 
begins to cross. She notices the appliance and stops in 
the road.  
32100 34300 
7 Van pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. As the 
appliance approaches a small road island, a large bus 
blocks the right-hand view and a van from the right 
pulls out in front of the appliance.  
22900 25800 
8 Car pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph inner city 
road. As the appliance approaches a set of traffic lights, 
the traffic coming from the right has their view 
34367 38100 
HAZARDS AND PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS         16 
 
 
 
restricted by a building, as such, a car does not see the 
appliance and pulls out in front of it.  
9 Car pulls out 
. 
The appliance is travelling on a 30mph road. As the 
appliance approaches a set of traffic lights, the traffic 
coming from the left have their view restricted by 
housing. A car does not see the appliance and pulls out 
in front of it. 
33034 35634 
10 Car pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling around a roundabout with 
traffic lights. A car from a left-hand side road does not 
notice the appliance and pulls out directly in front of it.  
43434 48767 
11 Large lorry 
ahead. 
The appliance is travelling down a narrow urban road. 
Ahead is a set of traffic lights with both the left and 
right-side views blocked by buildings. As the appliance 
approaches, a large lorry from the right turns, partially 
blocking the road. 
20100 35767 
12 Pedestrians 
walk in the 
road. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. 
Pedestrians from the right-hand pavement begin to 
walk into the road.    
21300 23234 
13 Van pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. Ahead 
there is a bend in the road to the left. As the appliance 
approaches the bend, a van on the opposite side of the 
road (hidden by the bend) turns directly in front of the 
path of the appliance.   
27234 31900 
14 Car almost 
pulls out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. Ahead, 
a large car from a right-hand side street almost pulls 
out in front of the appliance.  
15167 18334 
15 Mobility 
scooter pulls 
out.  
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. The 
road begins to incline, just past the brow of the hill, a 
mobility scooter enters the road from the right, directly 
in front of the appliance. 
27167 31967 
16 Pedestrian in 
the road. 
The appliance is travelling down a 40mph road. As the 
appliance approaches a set of traffic lights, a pedestrian 
is walking in the middle of the road.  
5967 14634 
17 Pedestrian in 
the road.   
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. A 
pedestrian hidden from view by a lorry parked on the 
left-hand side of the road enters the road and crosses in 
front of the appliance.  
43767 46400 
18 Car almost 
pulls out. 
The appliance is travelling down a busy 30mph road. A 
car, hidden from view by the stream of traffic on the 
32634 37234 
HAZARDS AND PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS         17 
 
 
 
opposite side of the road, almost pulls out of a right-
hand side road.  
19 Pedestrians 
walk in the 
road. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. 
Pedestrians hidden from view by queuing traffic on the 
right-hand side of the road, enters the road and crosses 
in front of the appliance. 
37300 42200 
20 Stabilising 
leg of work 
lorry blocks 
road. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph urban road. 
Ahead, a large work lorry with a stabilising leg restricts 
the road, turning it into a single carriage.  
31234 39867 
21 Car reverses 
towards 
appliance. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. Ahead, 
a car waiting at the traffic lights begins to reverse 
towards the appliance.  
25367 31767 
22 Ambulance 
on blue 
lights 
invades lane. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road 
approaching a pedestrian crossing. Ahead, an 
ambulance car on blue-lights overtakes the traffic 
waiting at the pedestrian crossing and invades the lane 
the appliance is in.  
23234 31434 
23 Car pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road with 
two lanes. The lane on the right has heavy queuing 
traffic. A car in this lane does not see the appliance and 
suddenly pulls out of the busy lane directly in front of 
the appliance.  
40800 47534 
24 Car pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. As the 
appliance approaches a traffic-light controlled cross 
roads, the right-hand view is blocked by a large 
building. A van coming from the right, turning left, 
stops in the road but unintentionally blocks the view of 
the appliance from other road users. A car from the 
right, going straight ahead, pulls out from behind the 
van, directly in front of the appliance.  
40567 42300 
25 Pedestrian in 
the road.   
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. A 
pedestrian on their mobile phone steps into the road 
from the left-hand side pavement in front of the 
appliance.  
27034 30700 
26 Cyclist veers 
towards 
appliance 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. A 
cyclist on the right-hand side of the road veers towards 
the appliance.  
29000 30967 
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27 Ambulance 
encroaches 
on the lane 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. The 
appliance approaches a set of traffic lights and turns 
right, as the appliance turns, an ambulance on blue-
lights on the opposite side of the road approaches, 
invading on the appliance’s lane.  
20000 24000 
28 Car pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. Ahead, 
a car parked on the left-hand pavements pulls out in 
front of the appliance.  
27234 31700 
29 Car pulls 
out. 
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. Ahead, 
a car from the left-hand side road pulls out in front of 
the appliance. 
15034 22700 
30 Pedestrian 
almost walks 
out.  
The appliance is travelling down a 30mph road. As the 
appliance approaches a pedestrian crossing a pedestrian 
almost walks out in front of the appliance.  
8034 10234 
 332 
  333 
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 334 
Additional measures included the percentage of a priori hazards responded to, and a 335 
selection of eye movement measures (time to first fixate the hazard, first fixation duration on 336 
the hazard, mean fixation duration on the hazard, number of fixations on the hazard, and total 337 
dwell time on the hazard). All response and eye movement data were only considered to 338 
relate to the hazard if they occurred during the hazard window (i.e. the period of time 339 
between hazard onset and hazard offset). Additionally, eye movements during the hazard 340 
window had to fall directly upon the hazard (+ approximately 1 degree of visual angle) to be 341 
considered as relevant fixations. These measures were analysed primarily via a series of 1x4 342 
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) comparing across the four participant groups. 343 
 344 
Procedure 345 
Fire Service personnel were tested in a quiet office in their respective Nottinghamshire fire 346 
stations while on shift. Control participants were tested within an eye tracking laboratory at 347 
Nottingham Trent University. Each participant was first asked to complete a battery of 348 
questionnaires: demographics, driving history, the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ; 349 
Reason et al., 1990; Parker et al., 1995), the Traffic Locus of Control (T-Loc; Özkan and 350 
Lajunen, 2005), and the Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS; Zuckerman, 1976).    351 
Participants undertook 3 tests in total: the hazard perception test (experiment 1), the 352 
hazard prediction test (see experiment 2), and a third test based on gap judgements (this latter 353 
test is not discussed in the current paper). The order of the perception and prediction tests was 354 
counterbalanced, and they were presented either before or after the gap judgement task. 355 
Participants were seated approximately 60cm from the screen and told that they would 356 
see video clips taken from the perspective of a fire-appliance driver, driving in an emergency 357 
response situation (i.e., a blue-light run). They were instructed to press a button as quickly as 358 
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possible to indicate the presence of a hazard that would require them to suddenly stop, slow 359 
down or change position in some way to avoid a potential collision. All participants saw a 360 
practice clip before beginning the experiment. 361 
 362 
Results 363 
One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) compared the four groups across a range of 364 
measures for the hazard perception test. Following the omnibus analyses a series of planned 365 
Helmert contrasts were conducted. These sub-analyses compared (a) the scores of control 366 
participants to the mean scores of all fire-appliance drivers, (b) the scores of novice, FA 367 
drivers to the mean scores of all experienced, FA drivers, and (c) the scores of high-risk, 368 
experienced, FA drivers to those of low-risk, experienced, FA drivers. These contrasts reflect 369 
the sub-hypotheses for the study: all FA drivers should out-perform control drivers; all 370 
experienced, FA drivers should out-perform novice FA drivers; and low-risk, experienced FA 371 
drivers should out-performance the high-risk FA drivers. Any significant contrast effects 372 
were adjusted for potential familywise error via Hochberg corrections, with differences 373 
accepted at the 0.05 level for 1-tailed tests (reflecting the directional nature of the a priori 374 
predictions).  375 
 376 
Response times 377 
One low-risk, experienced, FA driver was removed from the analysis as the number of 378 
hazards he detected fell more than 3 standard deviations below the mean detection rate for the 379 
whole sample. Response times (RTs) were calculated from the a priori hazard onset times. 380 
Failures to respond to a hazard were assigned a maximum response time, equivalent to the 381 
hazard offset (following McKenna et al., 2006). To minimize skew in the data a square root 382 
transform was used. The transformed RTs were then standardised into Z-scores using the 383 
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overall sample mean and standard deviation (SD) for each hazard. This process was 384 
necessary because the hazard windows varied in duration, and without standardisation, some 385 
hazards might exert a greater influence on the final mean score than others (following Wetton 386 
et al., 2010). While all analyses were conducted on these z-scored, square-root transformed 387 
RTs, for clarity of presentation in graphs these figures were converted back into millisecond 388 
response times using the mean and standard deviation across all hazards and participants. The 389 
converted response times for the four participant groups appear in Figure 2. 390 
 391 
392 
Figure 2. Response time to hazards (ms) across the four participant groups (with standard error 393 
bars added). Note: these scores have been converted back from Z-scores. 394 
 395 
A 1 x 4 between-subjects ANOVA on the response time data revealed a main effect of 396 
driving experience, F(3, 79) = 3.35, MSe = 0.48, p = 0.02. Planned Helmert contrasts 397 
confirmed that control drivers were slower to detect the hazard than all other fire-appliance 398 
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driver groups (1737 ms vs. 1580 ms; p = 0.003). There were no differences between the three 399 
groups of fire-appliance drivers (all ps > 0.05). 400 
A similar 1 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of a priori hazards that 401 
participants responded to (control = 77%, novice = 85%, high-risk = 79%, low-risk = 83%). 402 
The omnibus effect was not significant, and none of the planned contrasts reached 403 
significance. 404 
    
    
 405 
Eye movement measures 406 
The first analysis compared the percentage of a priori hazards that participants fixated (at 407 
least one fixation on the hazard, between onset and offset). Though the omnibus calculation 408 
was not significant (F(3, 79) = 1.89, MSe = 166.61, p = 0.40), the planned Helmert contrasts 409 
revealed a significant difference between novice fire-appliance drivers and experienced fire-410 
appliance drivers suggesting that the experienced drivers looked at more hazards than the 411 
novices (90.7% vs 85.0%, respectively; p = 0.04; see Figure 3). Following correction for 412 
familywise error, this comparison was marginal at best (p = 0.057). 413 
HAZARDS AND PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS         23 
 
 
 
414 
Figure 3. The percentage of hazards that participants fixated at least once, across the four driver 415 
groups (with standard error bars added). 416 
The number of hazards that were fixated was high, reflecting the fact that as the 417 
hazard window progresses, the hazards become more obvious and more likely to attract 418 
attention. Thus, a more sensitive measure might be the time taken to first fixate the hazard 419 
following onset. For this analysis, if a participant was looking at the appropriate location on 420 
the screen at the point of hazard onset, as if they had successfully predicted that a hazardous 421 
precursor would develop into a full hazard, they were considered to have a time-to-fixate 422 
latency of 0 ms. If, however, drivers failed to look at the hazard during the hazard window, 423 
they were given the maximum time possible, equivalent to the hazard offset (following 424 
McKenna et al., 2006). These measures were square-root and z-score transformed in order to 425 
reduce skew and ensure comparability across clips (as with the response times). 426 
A 1 x 4 between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of driver 427 
experience, F(3, 79) = 4.95, MSe = 0.55, p = 0.03. Planned Helmert contrasts identified 428 
control drivers as slower to fixate the hazards than all fire-appliance driver groups (p = 0.03), 429 
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though this appears to be driven by the short fixation latencies of the two experienced fire-430 
appliance groups, who were also faster to fixate than the novice fire-appliance drivers (831 431 
ms vs. 960 ms, respectively; p = 0.003; see Figure 4). There was no difference between high 432 
and low experienced fire-appliance drivers in terms of how quickly they fixated the hazards. 433 
Several measures were recorded to reflect the amount of attention that participants 434 
gave to the hazards. These included first fixation duration (the length of the first fixation 435 
given to a hazard by a participant), mean fixation duration (the average duration of all 436 
fixations given to each hazard), the number of fixations on each hazard, and the dwell time on 437 
hazards (the number of eye tracking samples that fell on the hazard during the hazard 438 
window, z-scored for comparability across clips). All of these measures were compared 439 
across the four driver groups, but no significant differences were found. 440 
 441 
442 
Figure 4. The average time taken to fixate the hazard for each driver group (with standard error 443 
bars added). Note: these scores have been converted back from Z-scores. 444 
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 445 
In addition to measures of attention devoted to the hazard, we also calculated the 446 
amount of time devoted to the hazard precursor. A precursor typically precedes a hazard and 447 
acts as a clue to the upcoming hazard. For instance a pedestrian on the pavement walking 448 
towards the road, may lead to the prediction that the same person may step out into the road 449 
and become a hazard. Measures of attention to these precursors reflect the preparatory work 450 
that drivers undertake in actively predicting imminent hazards. 451 
For the current analyses, the measure of dwell time was chosen to reflect attention 452 
given to the hazard precursors. The precursor was defined as the most appropriate clue to the 453 
hazard, and was typically located in the same physical space as the actual hazard, but 454 
preceded it in time (on many occasions the precursor was the hazardous object, but before it 455 
became hazardous). The dwell-time measure was calculated as the sum of all eye-tracking 456 
samples that fell on these precursors in a 1000 ms time window immediately preceding the 457 
hazard onset. By using a set temporal window, we did not need to convert dwell times to z-458 
scores. 459 
A 1 x 4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the precursor dwell times. This 460 
revealed a marginally significant effect of driving experience (F(1,79) = 2.7, MSe = 5158, p = 461 
0.05). Helmert contrasts demonstrated that novice fire-appliance drivers were likely to have 462 
significantly less dwell on the hazard precursors than experienced fire-appliance drivers (149 463 
ms vs. 195 ms, p = 0.02; see Figure 5). 464 
 465 
 466 
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 467 
Figure 5. The average dwell time (ms) on the precursor across the different participant groups 468 
(with standard error bars added).  469 
 470 
 471 
Questionnaire measures 472 
Of all the questionnaire measures taken, only the Driving Behaviour Questionnaire (Reason 473 
et al., 1990; Parker et al., 1995) proved interesting. Twenty-four items were given, split into 3 474 
factors: violations, errors, and slips/lapses. Cronbach’s alpha for all three was acceptable 475 
(0.83, 0.73, 0.66, respectively).  476 
The resultant participant means for the three factors were entered into a series of 1 x 4 477 
ANOVAs. In the analysis of errors, the omnibus test was not significant, F(3, 79) = 2.14, 478 
MSe = 0.50, p = 0.10, however planned Helmert contrasts revealed that low-risk, experienced 479 
fire-appliance drivers scored significantly lower  on the error factor of the DBQ (i.e. reported 480 
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fewer errors) than high-risk, experienced fire-appliance drivers (1.47 vs. 1.82; p = 0.02). No 481 
other contrasts reached statistical significance (all ps > 0.05).  482 
The omnibus test on scores for the violation factor was also non-significant (F(1, 79) 483 
= 2.23, MSe = 0.92, p = 0.09), but the planned contrasts revealed that low-risk experienced 484 
fire-appliance drivers reported significantly fewer violations than the high-risk drivers (1.60 485 
vs. 2.08; p = 0.02). No other contrasts reached statistical significance (all ps > 0.05).  486 
Finally, the omnibus test for slips and lapses also struggled to reach significance (F(1, 487 
79) = 2.34, MSe = 0.59, p = 0.08), but the contrasts once again revealed low-risk experienced 488 
fire-appliance drivers to report fewer lapses than the high-risk drivers (1.89 vs. 2.22; p = 489 
0.04). Following correction for familywise error however, this comparison was marginal at 490 
best (p = 0.057). No other contrasts reached statistical significance (all ps > 0.05). 491 
 492 
Discussion 493 
To summarise the results, all fire-appliance drivers responded faster to hazards than the 494 
control group, though there were no differences between the groups of fire-appliance drivers. 495 
The two experienced, fire appliance groups were, however, more likely to look at the a priori 496 
hazards. Novice fire-appliance drivers looked on average at 85% of the hazards, and 497 
responded to 85%, whereas the experienced fire-appliance drivers looked at 91% of hazards 498 
on average, yet only responded to 80% (which does not differ significantly from the mean 499 
novice response rate). We therefore suggest that both of the experienced groups were 500 
potentially aware of more potential hazards, yet decided to only respond to a proportion of 501 
those that they looked at (albeit a high proportion).  502 
The experienced FA drivers were also noted to fixate the hazards sooner than the 503 
novice drivers (see Crundall et al., 2012 for similar results with driving instructors in a 504 
simulator; cf. Huestegge et al., 2010, who failed to find such an effect when using static 505 
HAZARDS AND PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS         28 
 
 
 
images). Our experienced drivers were also found to spend more time looking at the 506 
precursors to the hazard. Together these results provide a clear story: the experienced FA 507 
drivers are better able to anticipate hazards. They spend more time looking at the precursors 508 
(or clues) to imminent hazards, suggesting that they can effectively prioritise those areas and 509 
objects within the scene that may give rise to a hazard. Through their prioritisation of these 510 
precursors, the experienced drivers are more likely to spot when a precursor turns into an 511 
actual hazard. This is reflected in their speed to fixate hazards and their higher proportion of 512 
hazards fixated overall. There was no difference between the high-risk and low-risk groups 513 
on any measure however, suggesting that either hazard perception skill is not relevant to their 514 
risk level, or that the test was not sensitive enough to evoke and record risk-related 515 
differences in behaviour in response to the hazards. 516 
The homogeneity of response times across the three fire appliance groups can be 517 
explained in two ways. First the experienced FA drivers may be applying a higher threshold 518 
for what they consider to be a hazard. This has been found previously with police drivers 519 
(Crundall et al., 2003) and may reflect their self-perception of driving skill (i.e. experienced 520 
drivers are more likely to look at the hazard and think ‘It may be a hazard, but I could handle 521 
it’ and therefore be less likely to press the button to acknowledge it. This is supported by the 522 
disparity between the number of hazards fixated and the number responded to by experienced 523 
drivers). 524 
Secondly, it may be the case that novice FA drivers have been sufficiently trained to 525 
be able to respond to on-road hazards with very quick responses. Even though they are slower 526 
to look at these hazards, when they finally do look at them, their training may allow rapid 527 
processing leading to a quick response. While this explanation might reflect the success of 528 
the training undertaken by the novice drivers, it still suggests that novice drivers have not yet 529 
developed the anticipatory skills that the more experienced drivers demonstrate. 530 
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Previous studies have also found eye movement differences between groups that have 531 
not translated into response differences (Chapman and Underwood, 1998; Crundall et al., 532 
1999). This suggests that the stimuli are sufficient to provoke experiential differences in 533 
behaviour, but that the simple response-time measure of the traditional hazard perception test 534 
maybe too insensitive to detect them. Unfortunately, a test of hazard perception skill must 535 
ultimately rely on simple behavioural measures (rather than eye movements or physiological 536 
responses) in order to achieve wide-spread take-up by the fire service. 537 
There are, however, a number of ways to iterate the test in order to obtain a simple 538 
response time measure that better reflects the underlying eye movement differences between 539 
novice and experienced fire-appliance drivers. First, more detailed instructions could be 540 
provided to participants regarding the decision to make a response to the hazard. By 541 
providing more concrete examples of desired hazard responses, we would hope to convert 542 
some of the hazards that experienced drivers spotted but decided not to report, into positively 543 
identified targets . At the same time, it could be useful to clearly define hazards not as things 544 
that ‘you would have to brake suddenly for’, but as things that ‘an average driver would have 545 
to brake suddenly for…’. This approach may also encourage experienced drivers to respond 546 
to hazards that they feel eminently capable of handling themselves, but which they 547 
acknowledge might be difficult for less-experienced drivers. 548 
Secondly, a traditional method of titrating clips is to analyse them individually to 549 
identify whether there are any clips that are extremely poor indicators of group differences. 550 
By removing specific clips we can then pare the test down to only include those clips that 551 
most clearly discriminate between experienced and novice drivers. Ideally, this would 552 
involve undertaking the initial study with a much wider range of clips, though the 553 
practicalities of collecting more footage and conducting longer studies with on-duty fire 554 
fighters prevented this. 555 
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Finally, we may try a different approach all together. An alternative variant on the 556 
traditional hazard perception test was proposed by Jackson et al (2009). Initially termed the 557 
‘What Happens Next?’ test, this targets the sub-component of hazard prediction skill, 558 
arguably the most important of the hazard perception sub-skills. When measured in isolation 559 
it can provide an ostensibly more robust discrimination between safe and less-safe driver 560 
groups, unconfounded by the multiple underlying sub-processes that afflict the traditional 561 
hazard perception measure. It is for this reason that we designed a hazard prediction test 562 
which was run concurrently with the hazard perception test. The results of the hazard 563 
prediction test are presented in the following sections.  564 
 565 
Experiment 2 566 
The second experiment is based on the occlusion technique first used by Jackson et al. 567 
(2009), and expanded upon by several subsequent studies (e.g. Castro et al., 2014; Crundall, 568 
2016; Lim et al., 2014; Ventsislavova et al., submitted). Each video ends abruptly as the 569 
hazard begins to develop and the scene is occluded.  570 
Jackson et al. (2009) demonstrated that occlusion is necessary to discriminate between 571 
experienced and novice drivers, as the alternative of leaving a frozen image of the final frame 572 
allowed novices additional time to seek out the answer. Thus the successful driver 573 
presumably needs to be looking at the right place at the right time (and probably be expecting 574 
the right thing to happen) in order to see the hazard. Drivers who successfully predict the 575 
upcoming hazard will have an advantage in this regard. 576 
The choice of occlusion point is ostensibly of vital importance. If one cuts the clip too 577 
late, everyone sees the hazard: no prediction is needed, and no discrimination will be found 578 
between safe and less-safe drivers due to a ceiling effect. Equally however, if one cuts the 579 
clip too early, without any possible clue to the upcoming hazard, then a floor effect will 580 
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remove group differences. In-between these two extremes however, minor variations in the 581 
occlusion point appear to have little effect on the discriminability of the test (Crundall, 2016). 582 
While earlier occlusions reduce the overall number of drivers who correctly predict the 583 
hazard, discrimination between novice and experienced drivers is maintained providing that 584 
some clue to the impending hazard remains. 585 
In the current study we opted to occlude mere hundreds of milliseconds after hazard 586 
onset. The rationale for ending the clip just after hazard onset is that the handful of video 587 
frames containing the initial development of the hazard gives the participant confirmation 588 
that their prediction is correct. The briefness of this post-onset event is so slight however, that 589 
it is unlikely to be registered by anyone who is not already looking at the appropriate 590 
location. 591 
The current experiment also follows the innovation of two studies (Castro et al., 2014; 592 
Lim et al 2014) in providing multiple-choice answers. Other studies (Jackson et al., 2009; 593 
Crundall 2016, Ventsislavova et al., submitted) have required verbal or written predictions 594 
from participants. While these provide rich data, this method is reliant on subjective coding 595 
and cannot be automatically marked to provide an immediate score. For this study we have 596 
followed the more pragmatic testing approach of providing 4 options, with one correct 597 
answer embedded in 3 distracter answers. 598 
The hypotheses for this experiment remained the same as that for experiment 1: all 599 
fire service personnel will out-perform controls, experienced FA drivers will out-perform 600 
novices, and low-risk, experienced drivers will out-perform high-risk, experienced drivers. 601 
 602 
 603 
Method 604 
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The same participants from experiment 1 undertook the current study, split into control 605 
drivers, novice FA drivers, low-risk, experienced FA drivers and high-risk, experienced FA 606 
drivers. Experiment 1 and 2 were counterbalanced across participants within the testing 607 
session.  608 
The methodology of experiment 2 is identical to that of experiment 1, except for the 609 
following modifications. The clips from experiment 1 (see Table 1) were edited to finish just 610 
as the hazard began to develop or become visible. A precursor to the hazard was always 611 
available, though the duration of precursors varied across the clips. At the point of occlusion, 612 
a screen was immediately presented displaying the question ‘What happens next?’. Four 613 
options were also provided, and participants were required to choose the most likely answer. 614 
Both the correct answer, and suitable distracter options, were decided in discussions between 615 
a group of transport psychologists and fire service personnel. Distracters were chosen that 616 
were as feasible as possible given the available precursors in each given scene, and were 617 
chosen on the basis of consensus. The order of the correct answer and the three distracter 618 
options on the screen was randomly determined for each clip. Participants were required to 619 
select the most appropriate answer using a computer mouse. They were aware that selection 620 
of the answer was not timed. 621 
The main dependent variable for this test was participant percentage accuracy in 622 
choosing the correct option across 15 clips. Other measures included the time to first fixate 623 
the hazard precursor, first fixation duration on the precursor, mean fixation duration on the 624 
precursor, number of fixations on the precursor and total dwell time on the precursor. 625 
Fixations were considered to have landed on the precursor if they occurred during the 626 
prediction window leading up to occlusion, and were spatially located on the actual element 627 
of the scene that acted as the precursor to the hazard (i.e. the clue to the imminent danger + 628 
approximately 1 degree of visual angle). As the precursor was the only relevant stimulus that 629 
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could be fixated, these windows were tailored to the natural duration of the precursor, rather 630 
than using a shorthand 1 second window as in Experiment 1. Prediction windows began when 631 
the clue to the hazard was first visible (e.g. a pedestrian becomes visible on the pavement) 632 
and ended when the hazard has just started to develop (typically 150 to 250 milliseconds after 633 
hazard onset, as defined in table 1). 634 
It was predicted that all driver groups would differ, with FA experience and low-risk 635 
leading to better prediction accuracy, underpinned by group differences in participants’ eye 636 
movements. Given recent evidence (Ventsislavova et al., submitted), we expected the 637 
prediction test to provide stronger discrimination between the groups than the perception test 638 
used in Experiment 1. 639 
 640 
Results 641 
 642 
One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) compared the four groups on their percentage 643 
accuracy in the prediction task, and on a range of eye movement measures. Planned Helmert 644 
contrasts were again conducted to assess differences between controls and all FA drivers, 645 
between inexperienced and all experienced FA drivers, and between two groups of 646 
experienced FA drivers split according to risk. The poorly performing outlier identified in 647 
Experiment 1 (a low-risk, experienced fire-appliance driver) was also removed from the 648 
current analysis for the sake of parity across studies. This was a conservative decision, as his 649 
performance on the prediction study was much better than on the initial study. 650 
 651 
Prediction accuracy 652 
When the percentage accuracies for all participants were compared in a 1 x 4 ANOVA a main 653 
effect of driving experience was revealed, F(3, 79) = 2.93, MSe = 382.48, p = 0.04. Planned 654 
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Helmert contrasts revealed that all fire-appliance drivers were significantly more accurate at 655 
predicting upcoming hazards than matched controls (69.2% vs. 63.3%, respectively; p = 656 
0.05).  It was also noted that high-risk, experienced fire-appliance drivers scored similarly to 657 
the novice drivers, and were therefore significantly worse at the prediction test compared to 658 
the low-risk driver group (65.3%  vs. 73.0%, respectively; p = 0.03; see Figure 6).  659 
 660 
 661 
Figure 6. The mean prediction accuracy (%) across the four driving groups for the ‘What 662 
Happens Next’ test (with standard error bars). 663 
 664 
Eye movement results 665 
The eye movement data of four further participants were removed due to loss of calibration 666 
during the test (one novice FA driver, one low-risk, experienced driver and two control drivers).  667 
Participants did not have much opportunity to look at the actual hazards in the prediction test, 668 
as the screen would occlude just as the hazard would begin to unfold (mere hundreds of 669 
milliseconds following hazard onset, as defined in Table 1). However any fixations that fell 670 
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within the temporal prediction window upon the hazard precursor (+ 1 degree of visual angle 671 
approximately), were considered to reflect how safer drivers can predict and seek out hazards 672 
before they occur. 673 
The first analysis of eye tracking data on the prediction test merely compared the 674 
percentage number of clips during which the drivers fixated the precursor within the prediction 675 
window. When subjected to a 1 x 4 between-groups ANOVA, this revealed a main effect of 676 
driving experience, F(3, 75) = 4.06, MSe = 880.51, p = 0.01. Planned Helmert contrasts showed 677 
that control drivers fixated significantly fewer precursors than all fire-appliance drivers 678 
(48.89% vs. 60.33%, respectively; p = 0.005). There was a suggestion in the means that low-679 
risk fire-appliance drivers might fixate more precursors than high-risk fire-appliance drivers, 680 
but this difference did not reach conventional levels of statistical acceptability (65.4% vs. 681 
57.7%, respectively; p = 0.09; see Figure 7). 682 
The time to first fixate hazard precursors was calculated as the start of the first fixation 683 
within the prediction window that landed on the hazard precursor, minus the time at which the 684 
prediction window opened for each clip. If participants did not look within the prediction 685 
window prior to occlusion they were assigned the maximum possible time to fixate (i.e. the 686 
full length of the prediction window; following McKenna et al.’s treatment of missing RT 687 
values, 2006). If participants were already looking at the appropriate location when the 688 
prediction window opened, they were given a time to first fixate of zero milliseconds. These 689 
measures were square-root and z-score transformed in order to reduce skew and ensure 690 
comparability across clips. Although the pattern of results followed that found in Figures 6 and 691 
7, with low-risk experience drivers having the shortest time-to-fixate, and control drivers taking 692 
the longest to fixate the precursor, the main effect did not reach significance (F(3, 75) = 2.14, 693 
MSe = 0.10, p = 0.10). 694 
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 695 
696 
Figure 7. The average percentage of hazard precursors that were fixated for each driving group 697 
(with standard error bars). 698 
 699 
While the time to first fixate the hazards in the hazard perception test (Experiment 1) is 700 
an informative measure that tells us which group of participants spot the hazard soonest, it is 701 
arguable how useful this measure is in the case of precursors in the current prediction test. 702 
When the precursor first becomes visible it contains very little information, and fixations upon 703 
precursors at this point may not reflect the meaningful extraction of hazard evidence (Crundall 704 
et al., 2012; Pradhan and Crundall, 2017). As the clip progresses, the precursor becomes more 705 
informative, with the most informative point being just before hazard onset. Therefore in order 706 
to predict what happens next, we might expect that the most accurate responders will be those 707 
who are looking at the precursor at the very moment that it changes into a hazard, just as the 708 
screen occludes (i.e. the safest drivers should have the smallest temporal gaps between last 709 
fixating the precursor and the onset of the hazard). On this basis we suggest that the temporal 710 
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proximity of the last fixation on the precursor to the occlusion point is more important than the 711 
first fixation on the precursor. 712 
To assess this hypothesis, the occlusion point for each hazard was subtracted from the 713 
end point of each participants’ final fixation within the prediction window, providing a measure 714 
of last-precursor-fixation-to-hazard lag. If participants did not look within the prediction 715 
window prior to occlusion they were assigned the maximum possible lag (i.e. the full length of 716 
the prediction window; following McKenna et al.’s treatment of missing RT values, 2006). If 717 
participants were however looking at the appropriate location at the point of occlusion, they 718 
were given a lag of zero milliseconds.  719 
A 1 x 4 between-groups ANOVA on these data revealed a main effect of last-precursor-720 
fixation-to-hazard lag (F(3,75) = 5.70, MSe = 0.01, p = 0.001). Planned Helmert contrasts 721 
revealed that control drivers had a greater lag than all fire-appliance drivers (i.e. they were less 722 
likely to be looking at the precursor at the time of occlusion; 719ms vs. 635ms, p = 0.001), and 723 
that high-risk, experienced drivers had a greater lag than low-risk, experienced drivers (667ms 724 
Vs. 600ms, p = 0.02). As can be seen from Figure 8, the low-risk, experienced fire-appliance 725 
drivers were fixating the precursor at the closest point to the occlusion on average, suggesting 726 
they were the group most likely to be expecting the appearance of the hazard. 727 
 728 
 729 
 730 
 731 
 732 
 733 
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 734 
 735 
Figure 8. The average last time to fixate on the hazardous precursor for each Driver Group 736 
(with standard error bars added).  737 
 738 
Several measures were recorded to reflect the amount of attention that participants gave 739 
to the hazard precursor. These included first fixation duration (the length of the first fixation 740 
given to a precursor by a participant), mean fixation duration (the average duration of all 741 
fixations given to each precursor), the number of fixations on each precursor, and the dwell 742 
time on precursors (the number of eye tracking samples that fell on the precursor during the 743 
prediction window). All of these measures were compared across the four driver groups, but 744 
only the analysis of the number of fixations proved to be significant, F(13, 75) = 4.11, MSe = 745 
0.01, p = 0.009. Planned Helmert contrasts revealed that all fire-appliance drivers made 746 
significantly more fixations on the hazard precursors than the control participants (0.6 vs. 0.5; 747 
p = 0.006). Low-risk fire-appliance drivers also made significantly more fixations on the hazard 748 
precursors than the high-risk drivers (0.7 vs. 0.6; p = 0.05; see Figure 9). As all these means 749 
are lower than 1 fixation on the precursor, the data are very similar to those reported in Figure 750 
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
Control Novice High-Risk Low-Risk
la
s
t 
p
re
c
u
rs
o
r 
fi
x
a
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
h
a
z
a
rd
 l
a
g
 (
m
s
)
Driver Group
p = 0.02 
p = 0.001 
HAZARDS AND PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS         39 
 
 
 
7, though the addition of rare multiple fixations on the precursor pushes the difference between 751 
high and low-risk drivers over the significance threshold. 752 
 753 
 754 
755 
Figure 9. The average number of fixations on each hazardous precursor for each Driver Group 756 
(with standard error bars added). Note: these scores were converted back from Z-scores. 757 
 758 
Discussion 759 
The results of the hazard prediction test stand in contrast to those of the hazard perception 760 
test. The behavioural responses (RTs) to the hazard perception test (Experiment 1) only 761 
demonstrated a difference between the control group and the fire-appliance drivers taken as a 762 
whole. The behavioural responses to the prediction test (prediction accuracy) not also 763 
demonstrated a distinction between the control group and the fire-appliance drivers, but the 764 
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low-risk group were also found to perform significantly better than the high-risk group. Thus 765 
the hazard prediction test has been more successful in discriminating between fire-appliance 766 
driver groups than the hazard perception test. This follows the pattern of results found by 767 
Ventsislavova et al. (submitted) albeit in a very different driving context. Ventsislavova et al 768 
found greater discrimination with a prediction test than a hazard perception test when 769 
comparing novice and experienced drivers from different countries. The current results 770 
demonstrate that the prediction test can be equally effective at discriminating on the basis of 771 
self-reported risk (rather than just experience) and can do so in a professional driver context 772 
that involves the highest levels of driver training. 773 
 The rationale behind the hazard prediction test is that safe drivers correctly prioritise 774 
and monitor potential precursors that may lead to hazards, and are therefore more likely to be 775 
looking in the right place at the right time. The current eye tracking results provide the first 776 
evidence in favour of this rationale, with the safest drivers being more likely to fixate the 777 
relevant precursor, and to be last looking at the precursor at the closest point in time to it 778 
becoming an actual hazard.  779 
 One alternative interpretation of these eye movement results is that the late fixations 780 
on precursors shown by the low-risk drivers might actually reflect the fact that they have only 781 
just looked at it. However, the groups do not significantly differ on how quickly they initially 782 
look at the precursors (and the means suggest a trend in favour of the safest drivers being the 783 
first to fixate the precursor, as well as being the last to fixate it). The low-risk drivers also 784 
make more fixations on the precursors than other drivers, though they do not differ in terms 785 
of overall dwell, suggesting that they may be monitoring other potential precursors with overt 786 
attention, returning to the precursor with the greatest evidence of becoming a hazard. 787 
 788 
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General Discussion 789 
The aim of this study was to create a test that could discriminate between groups of safe and 790 
less-safe fire appliance drivers in order to better identify training needs. As a surrogate for 791 
safety, we categorised our drivers according to experience of driving fire appliances, and 792 
their self-reported safety (based on frequency, severity and responsibility for past collisions). 793 
The stimuli were designed to capture both the view from the specific vehicle and the visual 794 
demands of the actual task, and were thus filmed from fire appliance under realistic blue-light 795 
conditions (an approach used only once previously by Crundall et al., 2003, 2005, whose 796 
videos were appropriated from real dash-cam footage from police vehicles, but were of 797 
relatively poor visual quality). 798 
Two variants of the hazard perception test were created: a traditional push-button 799 
hazard test requiring speeded responses to hazards, and a prediction test that provided 800 
participants with 4 possible outcomes for each clip following occlusion at the point of hazard 801 
onset. The hazard prediction test was the more successful of the two, successfully 802 
discriminating between the two highly-experienced groups of FA drivers, as well as 803 
differentiating all FA drivers from controls, on the basis of a percentage score for correctly 804 
predicted hazards (out of 15). The more traditional hazard perception test did not fare so well: 805 
the behavioural measure of response times could only discriminate between controls and all 806 
FA drivers. While this is in line with the literature which argues that emergency service staff 807 
have better hazard perception skills than control drivers in normal driving scenarios (Johnston 808 
& Scialfa, 2016; McKenna & Crick, 1991; Horswill et al., 2013), its lack of discrimination 809 
between the FA groups renders the perception test a poor potential tool for fire service 810 
instructors. 811 
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In addition to greater discrimination between groups, the prediction test also provides 812 
a simpler scoring methodology, readily understandable by future users. A score out of 15, or 813 
a percentage accuracy, is an unambiguous figure that demonstrates how well one performed 814 
in a test. Calculation of  response times, however, raises many questions. The selection of the 815 
temporal scoring window is a particular concern, with internet forums full of complaints that 816 
those taking the UK test are penalised for pressing too soon (see Crundall, 2016). Even when 817 
the scoring window accepts a valid response, different research groups process the resultant 818 
response times in different ways. While many researchers might reference a favoured study 819 
whose methodology they follow (as we do with Wetton et al., 2010), there is no agreed 820 
method for dealing with missing values, skewed distributions, and non-standardised response 821 
windows. Some researchers have suggested novel approaches to dealing with these issues 822 
(e.g. survival analysis, Parmet, Meir and Borowsky, 2014), though by removing response 823 
times from the test completely we can avoid all such problems, while creating a more 824 
transparent scoring method for the average user. 825 
It should be noted that in absolute terms, the significant differences between the 826 
driving groups are small. Are these still meaningful? The narrowness of these significant gaps 827 
between the high-risk and low-risk drivers reflects the fact that some high-risk drivers 828 
perform well on a prediction test, while some low-risk drivers still perform poorly. This is 829 
symptomatic of the fuzziness underlying the use of self-reported collision history to define 830 
our groups. Some drivers classed as low-risk might actually be quite dangerous on the road, 831 
but have still managed to avoid a serious collision, while other ‘low-risk’ drivers may have 832 
failed to report collisions in order to portray a safe image to researchers. Some drivers 833 
acknowledged they had been involved in other collisions that either were not worth rating 834 
(e.g. damage was inconsequential) or were too long ago to remember in detail, but it is 835 
possible that some of these collisions were more severe than participants admitted.  836 
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Conversely, some of our ‘high-risk’ drivers might be relatively safe. The collisions 837 
that led to their high-risk classification may have had mitigating circumstances that were not 838 
accounted for in our calculation, or their skills may have simply improved over time, possibly 839 
even as a direct result of a crash (e.g. Rajalin and Summala, 1997, found professional heavy-840 
vehicle drivers were the only sub-group of their sample to demonstrate prolonged favourable 841 
changes in driving style following a fatal collision). Given the likely underlying fuzziness 842 
between our high and low-risk categories, a significant effect is all the more impressive. 843 
Also, were the current test to ever be used in a diagnostic capacity, one would not set the cut-844 
off to catch all ‘high-risk’ drivers as defined in this study. Instead, only the extremely poor 845 
scorers would be targeted for further training. 846 
One further problem with defining our risk groups is the question, what is it that 847 
makes them risky: errors of performance or volitional risk taking? The hazard prediction test 848 
is designed to detect problems in identifying upcoming hazards, but will not measure risk-849 
taking behaviour. Looking at participant scores on the DBQ, it appears that our high-risk 850 
drivers suffer from both errors and slips/lapses more so than our low-risk drivers, yet they 851 
also score more highly on the violations factor. Thus our high-risk drivers represent a mixture 852 
of reasons that may account for their previous collision history, yet the hazard prediction test 853 
should only be discriminating these drivers from the low-risk group on the basis of errors. 854 
This further confusion of what constitutes a high-risk driver may have also weakened the 855 
effect. For future research it would be beneficial to separate out those drivers who are 856 
considered high-risk primarily due to errors from those who report high violation scores. 857 
 858 
Conclusions 859 
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Both tests have demonstrated that fire appliance drivers have safer responses to filmed 860 
hazards compared to control, responding faster to hazards that appear, and predicting a 861 
greater number of correct hazards following occlusion. The hazard prediction test however 862 
has proved more effective in identifying differences between sub-groups of fire appliance 863 
drivers based on self-reported risk, and this is reflected in the eye movements of our drivers. 864 
The success of the prediction test over the hazard perception test is all the more impressive 865 
given that both tests used the same clips. This demonstrates that the occlusion methodology, 866 
with a purer measure of hazard prediction accuracy, is responsible for the improvement in 867 
discrimination rather than any differences across stimuli. The success of this test paves the 868 
way for a diagnostic test of hazard prediction for fire appliance drivers that will allow 869 
training resources to be better targeted, while the stimuli also offer new potential methods for 870 
training these skills in the future. 871 
 872 
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 996 
Footnotes 997 
1. A fire appliance is large liveried vehicle, mounted with sirens and flashing lights, 998 
which is designed to transport a variety of rescue equipment, and fire-fighting media 999 
(e.g. water, foam). It has a raised driving position, and can usually carry 6 fire-fighters 1000 
in the cabin. Fire appliances are also called fire engines, fire trucks and fire tenders. 1001 
2. Malone and Brünken (2015) have also compared multiple-choice questions to 1002 
response times, but their questions appeared after the hazards had been passed by the 1003 
film car, and were therefore not designed to capture online measures of hazard 1004 
prediction. The authors referred to their multiple-choice trials as having low 1005 
ecological validity. 1006 
 1007 
